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Volunteers enable nonprofit organizations to reach more clients and more effectively fulfill 
their missions. However, the good done by these volunteers may be offset by their careless 
behavior. Rising fears that resulting lawsuits and monetary damages would deter potential 
volunteers from volunteering caused Congress to enact the Volunteer Protection Act. This 
research studies court decisions to ascertain whether the law fulfills its purpose and considers 
the implications of these interpretations for nonprofit managers. It also tests the usefulness 
of the hermeneutical approach to legal interpretation and to determine how the Act has 
changed as a result of these court decisions. 
 
America has a deep history of volunteerism that goes back to colonial days. Early 
colonists brought along the principles of Great Britain’s Elizabethan Poor Law, which 
included local responsibility for the care of the needy. The informal arrangement of families 
voluntarily caring for the poor evolved into almshouses, which then developed into more 
organized charitable societies (Powell and Wrightson, 2006). Benjamin Franklin led this 
effort through his Junto Club, a gathering of friends and acquaintances to discuss current 
events and scholarly topics. It was the starting point for many of his community-focused 
organizations, such as fire brigades and lending libraries, that were designed to provide 
services that the government could not, much like modern nonprofit organizations (Brand,s 
2010). The 19th century saw an increase in charitable enterprises, as labor organizations, 
mutual aid societies, and settlement houses sprung up to meet the needs of an increasing 
population (Powell and Wrightson, 2006; Ellis and Campbell, 2005). This expansion 
migrated into government as modern-day presidents understood and acted on the need for 
volunteerism. The second half of the 20th century saw the establishment of such programs as 
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the Peace Corps, Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), and the Thousand Points of 
Light Foundation (Light, 2002; Brudney, 1990). The 21st century saw the passage of the 
largest increase in spending in the history of Americorps/National Service programs in the 
2009 Serve America Act (Public Law 111-13, April 21, 2009; Nesbit and Brudney, 2010). 
This history creates a tradition of volunteerism that permeates the fabric of our 
culture. Four out of five charitable organizations utilize volunteers in some way (Urban 
Institute 2004). The use of volunteers is so extensive that it has been called the “third sector” 
of the American economy (Hartmann 1989). The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that as of 
September 2013, over 62.6 million (25.4 %) Americans volunteered for some type of 
organization (BLS 2014). Volunteers can be found across a wide segment of society, from 
the informal (helping a neighbor) to the formal (working through the auspices of an 
organization) and in private non-profits or governmental agencies (Brudney, 1999). 
But what happens when things go wrong? Accidents happen--people get hurt, or 
property is damaged. Sometimes the injuries result in lawsuits, which can lead to charities 
and/or their volunteers owing large amounts of money in damages. This, in turn, can 
exacerbate the organization’s financial well-being or scare off potential volunteers. 
One response to this problem was the enactment of the federal Volunteer Protection 
Act (the Act). The Act’s stated purpose is to protect volunteers from liability due to harm 
caused by their actions while volunteering (42 USC §14501). This legislation was first 
proposed in the 1980s, when there was concern over large jury awards and public pressure on 
government to enact limits on them (House Report No. 105-101 (Part I); House Judiciary 
Committee Hearing, Feb. 27, 1996). The House Judiciary Committee in its report to the full 
House cited this context as evidence for the need for legislation (House Report No. 105-101 
(Part I)). The Committee noted the increase in lawsuits against volunteers, the ensuing 
negative publicity, and the claims that these lawsuits dampened people’s willingness to 
volunteer their time (House Report No. 105-101 (Part I)). The Committee also cited the 
impact of increased insurance premiums on nonprofit organizations, often accounting for the 
largest item in nonprofits’ budgets (House Report No. 105-101 (Part I)). 
Approval of the Act was not unanimous. From the start, there were conflicting 
opinions regarding its application. Critics questioned whether the Act in fact accomplished 
its intended purpose, since its immunity protections are limited only to volunteers (Powell & 
Wrightson 2006). President Clinton, who ultimately signed the bill into law, was concerned 
that some of its provisions would make it harder for innocent persons to receive compensation 
for their injuries (Martinez 2003). 
When new legislation is enacted, the law is simply a set of words. It is only when 
they are applied to facts that laws become real. The process of applying law to facts involves 
statutory construction (interpretation of the words of the law) and an examination of the facts 
(context) (Wright & Miller 2014). With each case brought under the same law, the process is 
the same, but the results may differ slightly, leading to a variation of earlier interpretations 
and changing the state of the law ever so slightly. This process has a hermeneutical aspect to 
it, and, in fact, scholars have taken the hermeneutical approach to legal interpretation (Spaic 
2012). Legal interpretation has been labeled the “clearest manifestation of the hermeneutical 
reality that allows texts to speak to the present in a meaningful way” (Mootz, 1988, p. 540).  
  
Research Questions 
Our purposes here are two-fold. First, by analyzing how courts have construed the text 
of the Act, we offer a fuller understanding of the immunity actually provided by the Act. We 
want to know if the outcomes of these cases resulted in the Act providing the same levels of 
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immunity as its proponents intended. These judicial constructions of the Act have significant 
implications for both volunteers and nonprofit organizations. Second, we use the Act as a 
case study to test the usefulness of the hermeneutical perspective as applied to the law. In 
doing so, we seek to discover how the “tradition” of the Act has changed over the last 17 
years. 
To answer these questions, we conducted a search of legal databases for cases in 
which the Volunteer Protection Act played a part. In the 17 years since the Act’s passage, 
judges issued written opinions referencing the Act in 50 cases that made their way into the 
court system. This paper looks at how the court decisions in those cases changed the 
perception and meaning of the Act in relation to its original purposes and goals, and thus 
constitutes an example of legal hermeneutics. We first summarize the history and provisions 
of the Act and discuss its relationship with hermeneutics. We briefly review hermeneutics 
and legal theory. We then describe our data, methodology, and findings, and summarize our 
conclusions.  
 
Volunteer Protection Act 
The core of the Act is Section Four, which provides that a volunteer will not be liable 
for harm caused by the volunteer if the injury occurred during the course of volunteering, if 
the conduct of the volunteer was not reckless or criminal, and the volunteer was not operating 
a motor vehicle at the time (42 USC 14503(a)). Other exceptions include hate crimes, 
violations of Federal or State civil rights laws, and actions taken while under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs (42 USC 14503(f)). 
A volunteer is defined as an individual who performs a service for a nonprofit 
organization or government entity and does not receive compensation. It includes board 
members, trustees, and even officers, as long as they serve without pay (42 USC 14505(6)). 
The intent of the legislation is to protect volunteers of nonprofit organizations and 
government agencies from liabilities due to ordinary negligence when the volunteers are 
acting for the organization (Mowrey 2002, 2003) in order to promote the interests and 
sustainability of social service programs (42 USC 14501(b)). 
An examination of the literature should provide an interpretive baseline, but little 
literature discusses how the courts have applied the Volunteer Protection Act and what that 
means for future litigation. Research involving coverage of the Act generally falls into two 
genres. One genre consists of informational pieces geared towards practitioners (see for 
example, Johanson (1998) and Nonprofit Risk Management Center (2001)). The other type 
is found in law journal articles. These may come closest to describing the hermeneutical 
evolution of law, as they frequently offer histories of the development and applications of a 
particular law. However, legal scholars have not studied how the Act has been interpreted and 
applied by courts in the years since its passage. There is one exception. Brudney and Groble 
(2014) looked at the outcomes of cases involving the Act to determine its impact on the 
protection of volunteers and found that it only partly fulfilled its goal. 
Criticism can also be interpretive. Many opponents of the Act cite its language as 
the basis for their opposition. They argue that it should include stronger language defining 
“volunteer” and should eliminate the ability of organizations to sue volunteers (Powell and 
Wrightson ,2006). These discussions, and others like them, offer a sense of the expectations 
associated with its enactment, and provide a kind of “baseline” interpretation from which to 
start our hermeneutical journey. 
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Hermeneutics and Legal Theory 
Hermeneutics can be understood as a way to reach understanding through dialogue 
and various forms of discourse. The concept accepts that understanding comes from engaging 
in an ongoing conversation in which multiple perspectives reach a merging of the parts into 
a whole, which Hans Gadamer (2006) referred to as a fusion of horizons. The individual’s 
perspective, or view of the world, makes up his or her horizon of understanding. The history 
of hermeneutics is rich but can be thought about as transitioning through several phases, 
beginning with Schleiermacher’s analysis of text (context hermeneutics) to Dilthey’s 
approach of suggesting a process of placing oneself in the position of another (Lawn 2006). 
Heidegger focused on the self as absorbed into everyday tasks (absorbed hermeneutics), but 
also spoke of fore-having, fore-sight, or fore conception. In other words, the individual brings 
past experiences into present day activity while projecting into the future when fully absorbed 
in a task (Lawn 2006). Gadamer’s (2006) work on philosophical hermeneutics builds on these 
rich interpretations of hermeneutics by suggesting a promise of something shared or fused 
between people embedded in tradition with different horizons of understanding. 
To Gadamer, reasoning is possible by tradition intertwined with prejudice, as pre-
judgments to help make sense of history as applied to the present. Tradition can be thought 
of as the cultural concepts in which the horizons of understanding are not only contained and 
make sense, but are also continuously challenged and changed through experience. For 
example, the tradition of thought that supernatural beings are responsible for natural occurring 
events allow a horizon of understanding to be created around the concepts of the gods and 
their role in the natural world. Within this tradition, individuals are capable of rational 
engagement between each other in a common discourse in which an understanding of these 
events can fuse through hermeneutic discourse. To Gadamer, individuals are constantly 
seeking a better or more complete understanding of situations and experiences and do so when 
approaching a fusion of horizons between others through hermeneutic discourse. He is careful 
to note that complete fusion is nothing more than an aspiration than can never be reached and 
that individuals can get close to a fusion through dialogue (Lawn, 2006). 
A more extensive discussion of philosophical hermeneutics is beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, we can apply some of these concepts to focus this discussion on how 
the hermeneutical point of view is reflected in the interpretation of legal principles. 
There is some literature on hermeneutical legal theories. Spaic (2012) describes legal 
hermeneutics as the idea that a certain conception of interpretation can lead us to the 
determination of key concepts of law. Mootz (1988) recognizes that using the hermeneutical 
approach on conventional legal decision-making results in “appropriate attitudes towards the 
text” (p. 542) and that a theory of interpretation is needed when dealing with legal documents, 
whether it is a statute, constitution, or judicial opinion, in order to provide a satisfactory 
account of the legal system. 
Even without the authority of prior scholarship on the topic, it is easy to see how a 
hermeneutical approach to legal study can be applied. The construction of laws consists of a 
whole series of hermeneutical interpretations. For example, the litigation process begins with 
the filing of a lawsuit, with one party alleging that he or she has claim against another. These 
claims arise within the context of specific fact situations and usually involve the application 
of a law or the interpretation of a written document, such as a contract. If the dispute is settled 
(at any point in the process), that is the end of the process. But if the case is not settled, the 
trial judge must look at the evidence and the relevant law and decide what the facts underlying 
the dispute are and whether the facts fall within the language of the law. In doing so, the judge 
must not only look to the present facts, but also previous cases with similar facts. The horizons 
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that are core to Gadamer’s hermeneutical reality are multi-faceted in the legal system. They 
include the perceptions and views of the trial judge, each of the parties, and the attorneys. 
During each stage, the dialogue that is central to a hermeneutical way of thinking takes place 
as each side tries to convince the court that their version should prevail. 
The process itself involves an examination of the facts through both oral 
presentations and physical evidence (documents). The hermeneutical approach looks at the 
words in the document as they relate to the present facts. The judge then issues a decision, 
often in a written opinion. Hermeneutically, the decision creates a new interpretation and 
understanding of the law. According to Mootz (1988), the legal interpretation represents the 
clearest manifestation of hermeneutical reality (p.540). There is no room for the process to 
degenerate into pure methodology. The result must, and always will, be a decision. 
Interpretation and understanding do not stop there. If one of the parties does not like 
the decision of the judge, that party can file an appeal. Once again, documents and oral 
arguments make up the process. In the appellate process, the facts of the case are presented 
to the court in the form of numerous texts: briefs (arguments in favor of each side), the 
documents presented in the trial, transcripts of testimony, and the written opinion of the trial 
judge, if there is one. The appellate court then issues a written opinion based on these 
documents. Thus, the interpretation (decision) at the trial court level has created one level of 
understanding, and the appellate review creates another. The interpretative process continues. 
Every time the law is litigated, another interpretation is produced. Rules of precedent 
prescribe varying levels of weight to prior judicial opinions on relevant issues, creating 
complex webs of prior legal construction. Even the simple application of a law to the specific 
facts in a particular case can be said to result in an interpretation, because those facts are part 
of the “context” of the case, which is important in hermeneutical interpretation (Patton, 2002). 
Each set of facts will be different, thus each context will be different.  
  
Data and Methodology 
We began our consideration of the hermeneutical aspect of the legal interpretation of 
the Volunteer Protection Act by looking at the Act through the lens of the court system. The 
data set consists of all judicial decisions that discussed the Act that could be found between 
1997 and 2013. Fifty cases were identified by searching the case law databases on Westlaw 
and Google Scholar using the search query “Volunteer Protection Act.”  The lists overlapped 
to a large extent, but the Westlaw search resulted in 28 more cases than the Google Scholar 
search (which netted 36 opinions). Only two cases appeared in Google Scholar and not 
Westlaw. Altogether, there were 65 different court opinions, which included instances where 
a single case resulted in multiple judicial opinions. Only the opinion of the highest court in 
each case was considered. Cases were eliminated if the focus was the state volunteer 
immunity law instead of the federal Act, as those cases interpreted different texts and are 
outside the scope of this research. 
The study looked at the process in which the courts determine what the Act means, 
and if it applies to the case before it. This was completed by analyzing whether the court 
imposes its own meaning on the Act, or if it takes the language of the law at face value when 
making its ruling. For purposes of this research, an “outcome” is an ultimate decision of the 
court for one party or another. The outcomes of the selected cases were reviewed in terms of 
the following variables: type of defendant, alleged level of culpability, jurisdiction, level (trial 
or appellate) of the court rendering the decision, and whether the court decided the case on 
the basis of the immunity question or decided it on other grounds. 
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Defendants were separated into two categories:  board members and all other 
volunteers. Volunteers included all individuals providing some service to the organization 
without expectation of compensation, regardless of title, except for board members. Board 
members were placed in a separate category because they are responsible for the overall 
governance of the organization, and thus have different responsibilities from service level 
volunteers, who work for the organization at the operational level (Hazen and Hazen, 2012). 
Since some labels may not have reflected the volunteer status of a party, descriptions of the 
defendants in the court opinions were relied upon to assign cases to appropriate categories. 
For example, the president of an organization may be a paid or unpaid position. Where the 
court describes any position as “volunteer” or “unpaid,” the party was classified as a 
volunteer. 
Four categories of culpability were discerned from this set of cases: negligence, 
statutory violations (either federal or state), intentional acts, and civil rights violations. 
Negligence is generally defined as the failure to act as a reasonably prudent person would act 
under similar conditions (Garner and Black, 2004). Cases involving statutory violations 
include any situation in which a law has been broken. An intentional act is one that is 
performed with the purpose of carrying out that act (Garner and Black, 2004). Civil rights 
violations include gender or racial discrimination. While these actions can be, and usually 
are, also violations of statutes, the Act specifically mentions them as an exception to its 
immunity protections. As a result, they are classified in a separate category.  
  
Findings 
Table 1 illustrates a general breakdown of our case set. The cases were closely divided 
between state (27) and federal courts (23). Twenty-one states plus the District of Columbia 
were represented in the set of cases. Most of the cases involved complicated fact situations, 
resulting in multiple claims and multiple parties on both sides. In 34 cases, at least one 
defendant was a non-board volunteer. A board member or members was named as defendants 
in 16. Interestingly, no case named both board and non-board volunteers as defendants. More 
than half (26) of the cases alleged at least one count of negligence. The next most frequently 
alleged claims were violations of statutes (13). Seven cases alleged civil rights violations, and 
four cases involved intentional acts.  
  
Table 1 Breakdown of Cases by Courts and Types of Volunteer  
 
 
Court  Volunteer  
Total 
Cases  State  Federal  
Service 
volunteers  
Board 
members  
Negligence  18  8  24  2  26  
Statutory Violations  6  6  4  8  12  
Intentional Acts  3  1  3  1  4  
Civil Rights  0  8  3  5  8  
TOTAL  27  23  34  16  50  
 
The cases were grouped according to four attributes. Two are procedural and two are 
substantive in nature. 
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Court system: Was the case brought in federal or state court?  
Source of issue: This category looks at who raised the issue of immunity 
under the Act--one of the parties or the court.  
Basis for judicial determination: The source or basis for the court’s ruling. 
This was broken down into three subcategories: application of the Act, 
interpretation of the Act, and other grounds or reasons apart from the Act. 
Type of claim: This category looks at the actions that formed the basis for 
the lawsuit.  
  
Court System 
The number of cases brought in federal court (23) was slightly less than those brought 
in state courts (27). The types of claims fell into predictable patterns. The civil rights cases 
were brought under federal law in federal court. Negligence claims and those based on 
intentional acts were more likely to be filed in state courts (18) than federal courts (8). Cases 
based on violations of non-civil rights statutes were split almost equally between state and 
federal courts (6 and 7 respectively). This indicates that immunity offered by the Act is not 
restricted to a narrow category of cases, but is being used in diverse situations. As a result, 
volunteers may find themselves subject to lawsuits based on activities not generally thought 
of as risky.  
  
Source of Issue 
In all but two cases, the issue of whether the defendant was entitled to immunity under 
the Volunteer Protection Act was raised by the defense, as one might expect. In the remaining 
two cases, the court raised the issue of immunity under the Act on its own accord, but did not 
issue a decision on that point (City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.4th 747, 161 
P.3d 1095, 62 Cal.Rptr.3d 527 (2007); Gelinas v. Boisselle, 2011 WL 5041497 (D.Mass. 
October 17, 2011)).  
  
Basis of Judicial Determination 
In order to better understand the actions of the court when using the Act as the basis 
of its holding, the outcomes were broken down into three categories: (1) cases in which the 
court applied the language of the Act with minimal interpretative analysis when deciding 
whether immunity should be granted under the Act (application); (2) cases in which the court 
took a more in-depth look at the meaning of the statutory language before deciding whether 
to grant the Act’s immunity (interpretative); and (3) cases in which the court based its decision 
on grounds entirely outside the provisions of the Act (decided on other grounds). Table 2 
provides a breakdown of the cases according to the basis for disposition of the cases. The 
following paragraphs discuss these results.  
 
Application 
In 19 cases, the court addresses the question of whether the Act applies, but does not 
inquire as to the meaning of the specific language in the statute. The court generally recited 
the conditions required for immunity and described how the defendants met or did not meet 
those conditions. In these cases, more than half (11) resulted in the granting of immunity.  
 
  
Patricia A. Groble, Nicholas Zingale & Joseph Mead                                                                Nonprofit Organizations 
 
- 31 - 
Table 2 Basis for Disposition of Case 
 
Application   19 
   Immunity granted  11 
   Immunity denied  8 
Interpretative  8 
   Immunity granted  2 
   Immunity denied  1 
   Alternate statute  5 
Decided on other grounds   23 
   Alternate statute  13 
   Disputed facts  4 
   No factual liability  6 
Total 50 
  
Interpretative 
Differences in interpretation of the Act appear in several cases. The issue of whether 
the Act excluded immunity from acts that violated a statute was raised in three cases, resulting 
in three different interpretations. One stated that the Act did not apply to federal laws 
(American Produce LLC v. Harvest Sharing LLC, 2013 WL 1164403 (D.Colo. March 20, 
2013)), meaning that a volunteer was immune from liability if the volunteer’s action 
constituted a violation of a state law, but not if the volunteer violated a federal law. Another 
held that the Act was intended to apply not only to state laws but to federal laws as well 
(Armendarez v. Glendale Youth Center, Inc., 265 F.Supp.2d 1136 (D.Ariz. 2003)). A third 
case held the Act did not apply to violations of either state or federal laws (Davis v. American 
Society of Civil Engineers, 330 F.Supp.2d 647 (E.D.Va. 2004)). The Armendarez court also 
pointed out that the Act’s inclusion of specific exemptions from immunity implied that there 
were no other exemptions (Armendarez). If this tendency is taken to the extreme and all courts 
put their own spin on the same law, the effect would be differing levels of liability (or no 
liability at all) for actions based on the same facts, depending on where the lawsuit was filed. 
This result departs from a basic reason behind the Act: to provide a consistent standard across 
jurisdictions. Conflicting holdings from the courts create inconsistencies that a multi-state 
organization may face in volunteer management. 
Some courts took an interpretive approach when looking at the key terms defined in 
the Act (see 42 USC 14505(6)). One case separated the concept of volunteer as used in the 
Act from how that term was applied in other circumstances, such as an insurance policy 
(Atlanta Cas. Ins. Co., Inc. v. River Hills Antique Tractor Club, Inc., 2012 WL 40467 
(E.D.Mo. January 09, 2012)). In defining “applicable organization,” the Act includes 
organizations organized as a tax-exempt entity pursuant to the tax code or any organization 
operated for charitable, civic, educational, religious, or other social purpose (42 USC 
14505(4)). Based on this definition, the court in Elliot vs. LaQuinta (Elliot v. La Quinta 
Corporation, 2007 WL 757891 (N.D.Miss. 2007)) reasoned that nothing in the Act required 
a 501(c)(3) status. As a result, a group informally organized for the sole purpose of attending 
and competing in an athletic competition was an organization for purposes of the Act. The 
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result was that a chaperone was immune from liability resulting from the drowning death of 
a team member. Under this ruling, volunteers working with groups that are not formally 
organized may be entitled to immunity under the Volunteer Protection Act and, as a result, 
their organizations may end up as the sole defendant. The fact that these organizations are 
more informal in nature may indicate a less economically stable structure. Exposure to 
liability for their volunteers’ acts (which the Act does not preclude) may threaten their 
economic well-being. 
These nuanced differences in interpretation could have far-reaching effects in how 
volunteers and nonprofit managers utilize the Act in their management policies and practices. 
Organizations whose activities cross jurisdictions may need to create a tiered set of practices 
depending on how different courts treat the issue.  
  
Decided on Other Grounds 
Lawsuits often arise out of complex fact situations, resulting in multiple claims based 
on a many different legal theories or statutes. In many cases, it is not necessary for the court 
to decide every issue to dispose of the case. In our set of cases, more than half (28) of the 
decisions were based on statutes or legal theories other than the Volunteer Protection Act (see 
Table 2). Alternate grounds include the existence of another type of immunity (qualified 
immunity for government officials: Gelinas (cited earlier); Collier v. Clayton County 
Community Service Bd., 236 F.Supp.2d 1345 (N.D.Ga. 2002)), deciding that a statute other 
than the Act is a more appropriate basis for a ruling (Grant v. Phillips, 2013 WL 4585661(Cal 
App. 1st Dist., August 28, 2013); Johnson v. Black Equity Alliance, Inc., 26 Misc.3d 
1219(A), 907 N.Y.S.2d 100 (2010); Lomando v. US, 667 F.3d 363, 2011 WL 6849063 (3d 
Cir. 2011)), and other defenses raised by the defendant (Spiteri v. Bisson, 2013 NY Slip Op 
31023(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 29, 2013)). In the civil rights cases where the Act was brought 
up either by a party or by the court itself, all but one case failed to address the issue of 
immunity under the Act, perhaps because civil rights violations are not immunized under the 
Act.  
  
Type of Claim 
An analysis of the results by type of claim was interesting because the Act has some 
specific exclusions, including for intentional acts, violations of civil rights laws, and alcohol-
related misdeeds (42 USC §14503(a)(3),(4) and (d)). Table 3 shows the breakdown of case 
results by type of claim. In nineteen cases (19), the court ruled directly on the issue of 
immunity under the Volunteer Protection Act as part of its decision. Negligence cases formed 
the largest segment of this group. 
Cases in which defendants were held to be volunteers, and thus covered under the 
Act, involved negligence claims, with four exceptions. Two cases involved statutory 
violations, and one case each involved civil rights and intentional acts. The last two are 
notable because they are expressly excluded from the Act’s immunity. 
The case involving intentional acts was a complex litigation involving six individual 
claims arising out of the unauthorized clear cutting of forested land owned by a land trust by 
owners of the neighboring airport. In a subsequent counterclaim by the airport against the 
land trust for intentional interference with business relations, individual members of the land 
trust asserted immunity under the Volunteer Protections Act. In a footnote to its holding in 
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Table 3 Disposition of Cases Based on Type of Claims 
 
 
Disposition of Case 
Applicability of VPA 
Other 
Grounds 
Immunity 
Granted 
Immunity 
Denied 
Types of Claims:    
 
Negligence 
9 5 13 
 
Statutory Violations 
 
2 2 7 
Intentional Acts 
 
1 2 1 
Civil Rights 
 
1 0 7 
TOTAL 13 9 28 
  
favor of the land trust (and the other plaintiffs), the court noted that members of the land trust 
raised the issue of immunity under the Volunteer Protection Act; that they were volunteers 
within the definition of the Volunteer Protection Act, and, therefore, were entitled to 
immunity (Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 2008 WL 2426790 (Conn.Super. May 27, 
2008). This seems to indicate that allegations of intentional acts may not on their face 
eliminate the immunity granted by the Act. 
The courts in nine cases ruled that the defendants were not immune under the Act. 
Instances include where evidence indicated that the defendant acted outside the scope of his 
or her duties (Owen); where the defendant received compensation (Shanta v. United States, 
No. Civ 03-0537 RB/RHS (D. New Mexico January 29, 2004)), where the acts were shown 
to be intentional (Momans v. St. John's NW Military Academy, 2000 WL 33976543 (N.D. 
Ill. April 20, 2000); Maisano v. Congregation Or Shalom, 2009 WL 4852207 (Conn.Super. 
November 19, 2009)), where there was contradictory evidence that the defendants’ acts fell 
within the scope of the Act (Levy v. Clayton Downey Worthington, 2011 WL 5240442 
(D.Colo. October 31, 2011), and where it was shown that the lawsuit itself fell outside the 
scope of the Act, as it was a derivative action brought on behalf of the nonprofit organization 
against the volunteer board members (Memphis Health Center, Inc. v. Grant, 2006 WL 
2088407 (Tenn.Ct.App. July, 28, 2006)), lawsuits specifically excluded from the  
Act’s immunity. 
Despite the fact that civil rights violations are expressly excluded from immunity 
protection under the Act, eight such cases were found in our dataset. In one case, the court 
held that the individual defendant, the president of a prison accreditation organization, was 
entitled to immunity under the Act in an action alleging bad prison conditions as a violations 
of prisoners’ civil rights (Nunez v. Duncan, 2004 WL 1274402 (D.Or. June 09, 2004)). 
The other civil rights violations cases were disposed without the court holding on 
the availability of immunity under the Act. One case involved another lawsuit against the 
prison accreditation organization, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) (Morgan v. Mississippi, 2008 WL 449861 (S.D.Miss. February 14, 2008)). The court 
noted the claim of Volunteer Protection Act immunity, but decided the case on the “public 
accommodation” requirement of the ADA. In other cases, the court based its rulings on other 
reasoning, for example, the defendant having immunity under another statute (Collier v. 
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Clayton County Community Service Bd., 236 F.Supp.2d 1345 (N.D.Ga. 2002)), and did not 
address the issue of whether immunity could be had under the Volunteer Protection Act.  
  
Analysis   
Our first research question asks whether these court decisions changed in any way the 
immunity for volunteers intended by its drafters and proponents. The Act provides for 
immunity for any unintentional actions occurring during the course of one’s volunteer 
activities. Before this law was enacted, there was a possibility that the volunteer would be 
held accountable and owe monetary damages. The Act changed that principle. Now, if the 
court finds that the injuring party fits within the Act’s definition of volunteer, immunity can 
be granted, and no liability on the part of the volunteer would ensue, unless the case fell into 
one of the Act’s exclusions. The court decisions we examined were consistent with that 
reasoning. Those cases where the volunteer was denied immunity involved fact situations 
which fell within the exceptions stated in the Act itself, disputed fact situations, or facts taking 
the lawsuit outside the coverage of the Act. These specific outcomes did little to alter the 
availability of immunity to volunteers originally conferred by the Act. 
There may be some negative implications for organizations. One criticism is that the 
Act imposes ultimate responsibility for volunteers’ misconduct on the organization, although 
it does allow the organization to sue the volunteer (42 USC §14503(b) and (c)). Proponents 
of the Act took the position that increasing lawsuits were scaring away volunteers, and that 
this legislation would alleviate those fears and encourage volunteerism (House Judiciary 
Hearing, 1996). This implies an intent to protect the tradition of American volunteerism by 
the law’s proponents. 
Using the Act as a case study of the hermeneutical aspect of law, we asked if the 
outcomes of the court decisions which involved the Act changed the Act’s original tradition 
or horizon of understanding. The debate during the legislative hearing process created the 
Act’s tradition, and it included the intent to protect. Both criticism and advocacy are linked 
to and become part of its tradition. Hermeneutics informs us that the meaning or interpretation 
of the Act should have changed as a result of court decisions over the 17 years since its 
enactment. The question is, has it?  There are two ways to gauge whether this has occurred. 
One is by looking at the cases in terms of the four attributes we defined above: whether the 
case was brought in federal or state court, who raised the issue of immunity, the basis for the 
court’s decision, and the type of claim filed. The second is to look at the overall impact of 
these cases. 
An examination of the two procedural attributes, whether a case was filed in federal 
or state court and who raised the applicability of the Volunteer Protection Act, shows that 
there was no shift in how the Act was being interpreted. We have observed that cases were 
filed in the court system where one would expect them. For example, violations of state 
statutes were filed in state courts, civil rights cases were filed in federal courts. Cases alleging 
negligence, which is generally subject to state jurisdiction, were filed in federal only if they 
also raised a federal issue (see, for example, Elliot v. LaQuinta Corporation, cited earlier). In 
all but two cases, the issue was raised by the volunteer/defendant. This too was expected. 
Procedural rules govern these aspects of a case, and there is nothing to indicate any shift away 
from that pattern by the terms of the Act or its interpretation. 
The substantive attributes, that is, the types of claims and the basis for court 
decisions, provide some sense of change in interpretation of the Act. In 19 cases, the court 
undertook to apply the provisions of the Act at face value, simply by listing the Act’s 
qualifications to be considered a volunteer, and determining if the defendant met those terms. 
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There was very little, if any, discussion of what those terms meant. These cases alone make 
it difficult to see any shift in the meaning of the Act. But a shift begins to take place in the 
cases we categorized as interpretative. In those instances, there were either conflicting 
interpretations among two or more court cases, or the court actively engaged in construing 
the language of the Act. Conflicts arose in the context of whether the Act excludes violations 
of federal law (American Produce, LLC; Amerandez; and Davis; all cited earlier); whether 
the Act could apply in a case filed on behalf of an organization (Melucci v. Sackman, 37 
Misc.3d 1212(A), 961 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2012)); and when considering the definition of an 
organization (Elliott, cited earlier) and of a volunteer (Atlanta Casualty Ins. Co., cited earlier). 
These conflicting interpretations create an uncertain landscape, especially for large, multi-
state organizations. Local nonprofit organizations adhere to their own state’s court rulings 
and may be unaffected by what happens across the state line. But larger institutions will find 
themselves having to consider more than one interpretation of volunteer immunity, which 
contradicts one of the purposes of the Volunteer Protection Act. These findings indicate little, 
if any, shift in the understanding of the Volunteer Protection Act. A majority of the cases 
didn’t consider the implications or application of the Act and used other statutes or legal 
theories to decide the case. Approximately half of the cases that did consider the terms of the 
Act did so by determining eligibility for immunity on the basis of the facts with minimal 
effort to interpret the statutory language. And the few that did go deeper often ended up 
limiting the application of the Act to its terms. 
In more than half the cases, the court discussed the Volunteer Protection Act, but 
based its decision on grounds other than the Act. Why would the court choose to resolve cases 
on bases without considering how the Act applied?  Judges bring their own horizons to each 
case; each law has its own horizon (Mootz 1988). Judges often resolve cases by looking to 
the legislative history or past decisions; when they do so, a “fusion of horizons” occurs – the 
legal precedents becoming fused with the present case (Mootz 1988). It may be that 
interpreting the Act would be more difficult than resolving some other dispositive point of 
law. Perhaps in those cases it was easier to reconcile the horizon of the case with another law. 
There is some evidence of this in the ambiguity over whether the Act grants immunities to 
volunteers who violate other statutes. Courts reached different decisions on this question. 
Two cases specifically held that the Act did not apply (Neighborhood Assistance Corporation 
of America v. First One Lending Corporation (2012 WL 1698368 (C.D.Cal. May 15, 2012)); 
Hall v. Bean (2013 WL 3086820 (D38Tex.App.-Hous. (14 Dist.). June 20, 2013)), and one 
case which held that it did (Ventres, cited earlier). 
 Our findings raise the additional question of why the Volunteer Protection Act has not 
been utilized more frequently. In the almost two decades since the Act took effect, less than 
50 cases have judicial opinions noting its provisions. Of those, only 20 actually applied the 
Act to the facts. The courts in the remaining cases chose to base their rulings on other bases. 
Why have there been so few decisions? 
One possibility is that the Act has not been raised simply because volunteers are at 
low risk of suit. Researchers have questioned whether volunteers have actually been the target 
of lawsuits as frequently as the proponents of this legislation proclaimed (Horwitz and Mead, 
2009). Given that scenario, perhaps the Act’s enactment was more symbolic than substantive. 
It may be a “legal placebo,” a measure to offer the appearance of a solution where the only 
problem is perception (Brandt, 1983). 
Or perhaps volunteers are being sued, but they are not raising the Act’s defense 
because they do not know about it or believe that it does not apply to them. Our data do not 
include cases where volunteers are sued but choose not to raise the Act’s defense. However, 
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we think it is unlikely that there are many cases that fit this situation, for several reasons. 
First, the Act was reasonably well publicized and is communicated to nonprofit organizations 
through numerous practitioner pieces and blog posts (see, for example, Johansen 1998). 
Second, attorneys who represent the volunteers have a duty to find and advance reasonable 
arguments on their clients’ behalf and have every incentive to find and assert volunteer 
immunity. A third explanation is that volunteers are being sued, but are invoking immunity 
under state volunteer immunity laws instead of the federal Act. This, too, is unlikely, as we 
think most volunteers would choose the safer alternative and assert the protections of both 
state and federal volunteer protection laws, as there is little added cost to asserting both. In 
fact, this occurred in several cases. Finally, perhaps the Act is deterring lawsuits from being 
brought against volunteers in the first place, or, if a lawsuit is brought, it is withdrawn early 
in the process before the expense of having to litigate to judicial resolution is incurred by the 
volunteer. If true, then the Act would be fulfilling its stated purpose. 
This final explanation would mean that the Act is primarily being interpreted outside 
of the courts, instead of within, contrary to the traditional legal perspective that law is 
interpreted by the courts. There are other instances where parties outside of the courts are the 
primary arbiters of law. For example, separation of power disputes between branches of 
government are often not susceptible to judicial resolution due to jurisdictional and political 
issues, and instead are resolved through repeated interactions between the branches and 
precedent set by behavior over time. An illustration of this is the nature of the Senate’s “advise 
and consent” role and the debate over the extent to which the Senate should confirm the 
President’s well-qualified nominees. However, there are no jurisdictional problems with the 
Act being brought to the courts, making it curious that it would primarily be interpreted by 
institutions outside of the courts. 
It is noteworthy that the Act was considered almost equally in both state and federal 
courts. These courts have different rules governing their procedures and different institutional 
characteristics. For example, federal judges are appointed for life, while state judges are often 
elected. Interestingly, we found that federal and state decisions did not differ significantly 
from one another.  
  
Conclusion 
The expectations created by the proponents of the Act during the legislative process 
created its own horizon of understanding. The clash between this horizon and the horizon of 
the present in each case created another, new, tradition or horizon. Our examination of this 
set of cases showed a complex pattern of interpretations that runs the spectrum from a 
straightforward application of the law to the facts, to an examination of the language of the 
statute, and, finally, to a decision not to rule on the applicability of the law at all. 
Courts that actively considered the question of whether to apply the immunity 
protections of the Act generally did so by examining the meaning of the language in the 
statute. Either the defendant met the criteria of volunteer according to the definition set forth 
in the Act or he did not. The majority of the cases were decided without recourse to the Act. 
Decisions regarding the need for a structured organization or the diverse opinions on the 
applicability of the Act to violations of state and/or federal statutes have changed the meaning 
of the Act somewhat. But most cases did not result in any significant change in meaning. As 
a result, the overall impact of these cases is that the Act’s horizon of understanding has not 
changed much since its enactment. 
There is another hermeneutical aspect that resides outside the courtroom. The 
collective findings in these cases create yet another horizon when read by those outside the 
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judicial system. Volunteers and nonprofit managers may take these findings and interpret 
them to fit their own situations. For volunteers, their understanding of what the cases say 
might go so far as to impact the basic decision of whether to volunteer at all. Nonprofit 
managers may use their interpretation as a guide to formulate volunteer policies and practices. 
If courts are finding resolution on the merits to be easy but deciding immunity difficult, then 
the proponents of the Act were correct that some volunteers are being subject to meritless 
litigation, but they were incorrect in their view that the Act would be an effective shield (since 
the court is resolving the case in volunteers’ favor for reasons other than the Act). 
These cases are decided by different judges reviewing different and unique 
situations, each with their personal world view, or horizon. In addition, hermeneutics holds 
that the text itself, in this case, the Act, has its own tradition. Hermeneutical change results 
from the confrontation between a person’s traditional horizon and the hermeneutical demands 
of the present. Mootz (1988) notes that legal change occurs when the meaning of the text no 
longer coincides with past interpretations and thus opens up new possibilities of 
interpretation. If this conflict is significant enough, the interpreter’s sense of tradition will 
also change. 
The tradition of volunteering has been around for a very long time. The Volunteer 
Protection Act and discourse surrounding the meaning of this legislation has been in existence 
for only 17 years. An argument can be made that the tradition of volunteering remains 
unchanged even in the midst of an evolving understanding regarding the liability of 
volunteers. One read into our findings is that the Volunteer Protection Act has done what was 
intended to help preserve our Nation’s rich tradition of volunteerism. At the same time, this 
project finds that the horizon of understanding of volunteer protection within this tradition is 
continuously at play, and that the Volunteer Protection Act appears to be a part of the 
discourse, but not to the degree that we might have expected within the courts. This project 
falls short of providing a substantive explanation for this finding, other than to suggest that 
the Act provides a context that has not changed much nor produced a robust legal 
hermeneutical interpretation of the Act within the courts. Perhaps this is because the 
American tradition of volunteering is substantially anchored beyond that of the Volunteer 
Protection Act, suggesting that even when “…the fusion of the horizons of interpretation 
changes constantly, just as our visual horizon also varies with every step that we take” 
(Gadamer 2006, p. 474), the interconnection with past meanings of the volunteering tradition, 
that extend beyond liability and legal interpretation, remains essential and ubiquitous.  
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